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Because appeals from the boards of contract appeals and the Court of
Federal Claims involving contract disputes comprise a sliver of the volume
of cases heard by the Federal Circuit,1 any government contract decisions
issued are of significant import to the government contracts community.
In one area of focus—the evolving requirements of contract claims—the
contracting officer’s duty of claim resolution is more challenging than
ever. This Foreword examines the historical development of contract
* Chair, Civilian Board of Contract Appeals.
The views expressed are my own and in no way attributable to the United States
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, my colleagues, or to the United States Federal
Government. I thank my law clerk, Matthew Lewis, for assisting me with this Foreword.
1. For example, of the types of appeals heard by the Federal Circuit, the total
time devoted to the patent docket has been estimated by one Federal Circuit judge as
exceeding 80%. See Timothy B. Dyk, Foreword, Federal Circuit Jurisdiction: Looking Back
and Thinking Forward, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 971, 973 (2018).
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appeals and the role of contracting officers in the dispute process, and
highlights recent decisions impacting contracting officers.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT APPEALS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The primary jurisdiction of the boards of contract appeals has been
government contract cases under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA).2
Various fora resolving these disputes have existed since the founding
of our nation. Courts and boards have been created, separated, and
combined through a patchwork of legislation and administrative
action before finally arriving at the judicial forum we see today. Under
current law, CDA claims are first heard by a contracting officer,3 before
being appealed to either a board of contract appeals or the Court of
Federal Claims (CFC) under a shared jurisdiction. From there, a case
may be appealed from either forum to the Federal Circuit and might
be heard by certiorari in the Supreme Court.
The role of the contracting officer is unique. Initially, the
contracting officer functions as the government’s advocate while
negotiating for the government. The contracting officer’s role changes
once he or she is called to render a final decision under the disputes
clause. This quasi-judicial duty of the contracting officer is a
particularly important nuance to the field of government contracting.
It is only after a contractor has submitted a claim to the contracting
officer that a case may be brought to either the CFC or a board of
contract appeals.4 The contracting officer also must make a final
decision (or fail to do so within the required period of time) before a
claim is appealable. In this decision-making role, a contracting officer
has an obligation not only to follow the applicable laws and regulations
but also to treat contractors fairly.5 This role in making preliminary
2. Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C.
§§ 7101–7109 (2012)).
3. A contracting officer is “a person with the authority to enter into, administer,
and/or terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings.” FAR
2.101 (2018) (defining “Contracting Officer”).
4. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103–7105.
5. S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 1 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235
(explaining one of the purposes of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 as “insur[ing]
fair and equitable treatment to contractors”); FAR 33.211 (outlining the steps a
contracting officer must follow when making a decision); FAR 1.602-2(b) (describing
contracting officers responsibilities to include “[e]nsur[ing] that contractors receive
impartial, fair, and equitable treatment”); see also Penner Installation Corp. v. United
States, 89 F. Supp. 545, 547 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (“[T]he contracting officer must act impartially
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decisions serves as a gatekeeper in one sense, alleviating the burden
on the fora that would otherwise hear these complaints if the disputes
could not be resolved at the contracting officer level. If appealed, the
contracting officer’s final decision and the underlying administrative
record provide the initial evidentiary record, though the boards and
CFC allow the record to be supplemented and will hear issues of both
law and fact de novo.6
I. HISTORY OF CONTRACT APPEALS
A. Early History
Contracts with the federal government (or what would become the
government) extend back to the time of the Revolutionary War,
preceding formal design for contracting disputes or appeals.7 Under
the structure of the Articles of Confederacy, the power to pay federal
expenses would be decided by the “United States, in Congress
assembled.”8 After the founding of the current United States
government, the underlying principle of sovereign immunity
(affecting contracting disputes to this day)9 limited the ability of courts
to resolve contract claims against the United States.10 Thus, if a federal
contractor sought to be reimbursed for a claim, they would take their
claims directly to Congress or to the Treasury Department.11
One of the most famous government procurements highlights the
early relationship between the United States government and federal
contractors. In 1798, fearing a potential war with France, Congress

in settling disputes. He must not act as a representative of one of the contracting parties,
but as an impartial, unbiased judge.”), aff’d per curiam, 340 U.S. 898 (1950).
6. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7104–06.
7. See Space Gateway Support, LLC, ASBCA Nos. 55608, 55658, 13-1 BCA ¶ 35,232.
8. Floyd D Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution
from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 634 (1985)
(citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VIII, para. 1).
9. See, e.g., PAE-Parsons Glob. Logistics Servs., LLC v. United States, 145 Fed. Cl.
194, 197–98 (2019) (reviewing the limits of the Tucker Act and sovereign immunity).
10. See Shimomura, supra note 8, at 637 (citing 2 W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS & M.
BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS 4 (1978)); Collin D. Swan, Government
Contracts and the Federal Circuit: A History of Judicial Remedies Against the Sovereign, 8 J. FED.
CIR. HIST. SOC’Y, 105, 105–06 (2014).
11. See Shimomura, supra note 8, at 644–45 (citing Charles C. Binney, Origin and
Development of Legal Recourse Against the Government in the United States, 57 U. PA. L. REV.
372, 381 (1909)); Swan, supra note 10, at 106.
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allocated $800,000 for purchasing military equipment.12 Eli Whitney,
already well known for inventing the cotton gin, received a contract
award to manufacture firearms.13 In 1801, seeking additional time to
perform his contract, he conducted an in-person demonstration of his
work on the contract for John Adams (the active president), Thomas
Jefferson (the president-to-be), and other officials.14 To exhibit his
progress, he unloaded standardized firearm components onto a table
and proceeded to give one of the first demonstrations of an
interchangeable parts system, where he picked up parts at random
from the pile (or at least appeared to do so) and showed how any
individual part would fit any other part it was intended to mate with.15
Whitney’s contract demonstration, now famous, provides an example
of the hands-on approach to contract disputes. It also highlights the
inefficiency of the early system. This direct communication with elected
officials proved not to be practical going forward. Growth of federal
contracts led to an increasing amount of contract disputes that Congress
had to hear and vote on . . . or perhaps ignore.16 From 1838 to 1848,
there were 17,574 contract petitions to Congress, with few petitions
receiving approval by the House and Senate.17
To resolve this issue, in 1855, Congress established the Court of Claims
to hear disputes from government contractors.18 However, the original
version of this court was less than effective.19 Congress had not provided
the Court of Claims with the authority of final judgment, and Congress
would instead review the decisions made by the court. This system left
many contractors wanting, as Congress might reject the court’s decision
or ignore the court’s judgments.20 In his 1861 congressional address,
President Lincoln alluded to this inefficient system: “It is as much the duty
of Government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens,
as it is to administer the same between private individuals. The
12. James V. Joy, Jr., Eli Whitney’s Contracts for Muskets, 8 PUB. CONT. L.J. 140, 142 (1976).
13. Id. at 143.
14. Id. at 144.
15. Id.
16. See Swan, supra note 10, at 106–07 (describing the difficulties faced by Congress
in dealing with significant increases in claims).
17. Id. at 106 (citing 2 W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS & M. BENNETT, supra note 10, at 10).
18. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
19. Swan, supra note 10, at 107.
20. Id.; see also Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 9, § 2, 12 Stat. 765 (providing that petitions
and bills for private claims be sent to the court “unless otherwise ordered by resolution
of the house in which the same are presented or introduced”).
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investigation and adjudication of claims, in their nature belong to the
judicial department . . . .”21 Accordingly, in 1866, Congress granted the
Court of Claims the authority to issue final judgments, thereby securing
contractor appeals from both congressional action and inaction.22
B. Early Contracting Officials and Disputes Clauses
While authority over contracting disputes was granted to the Court
of Claims, practical barriers prevented the court from actually deciding
many disputes. Contract disputes clauses were developed and
implemented into government contracts beginning in the nineteenth
century.23 These clauses, different than what is now supplied in
contracts pursuant to the CDA, provided an agency official or board
with the authority to resolve contract appeals.24 Some clauses might
provide that a contracting officer’s decision was the final
determination of fact, while others would give contracting officers or
agency officials the power to decide both law and fact, limited only by
administrative review.25 Thus, while courts had jurisdiction to hear
contract disputes, any actual review of contracting officer or
administrative action was limited.26
In one early example, Kihlberg v. United States,27 the government
contracted to transport supplies and goods by railroad. The contract
stipulated that reimbursement would be paid based upon the shipping
distance determined by the chief quartermaster.28 The quartermaster,
however, made a determination inconsistent with the reality of
performance, resulting in contract reimbursement that under-recognized
the contractor’s monetary entitlement.29 Yet, because both the government
21. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 2 (1862); see also Swan, supra note
10, at 107–08 (describing President Lincoln’s comments regarding the Court of
Federal Claims’s limitations during his 1861 inaugural address to Congress).
22. Act of March 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
23. See James V. Joy, The Disputes Clause in Government Contracts: A Survey of Court
and Administrative Decisions, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 11, 13 (1956).
24. Franklin M. Schultz, Proposed Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement:
The Legislative Battle over the Wunderlich Case, 67 HARV. L. REV. 217, 217 (1953).
25. Id.
26. See Comment, Government Contracts Disputes: An Institutional Approach, 73 YALE
L.J. 1408, 1410–11 (1964) (noting that a contractor had little power in the bargaining
of disputes clauses); see also Arthur V. Wittich, Contracting with the Federal Government:
The Dispute Resolution Process, 5 PUB. LAND L. REV. 128, 129 (1984).
27. 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
28. Id. at 401.
29. Id.
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and the contractor had agreed to be bound by the chief quartermaster’s
determinations, the court found the chief quartermaster’s decision to be
binding and not to be overturned on appeal outside of fraud, gross mistake
indicating bad faith, or “failure to exercise honest judgment.”30
This deference to contract clauses and contracting officer decisions
was maintained for many years,31 culminating in the unanimous
decision in United States v. Moorman.32 The Court found that the
determination of the “contractually designated agent,” here the
Secretary of War, was conclusive absent “fraud, or such gross mistake
as necessarily implied bad faith,” a more limited standard than the
early Kihlberg decision.33 The Court also noted the policy of such
clauses as enabling more efficient settlement, saving the government
from costly litigation.34
Just three years later, however, the Supreme Court would further restrict
judicial review of contracting officers and agency decisions in United States
v. Wunderlich.35 According to the contract, the contracting officer’s factual
determinations were final, and the contractor could only appeal the
officer’s determinations to the agency’s secretary.36 The Court held that,
where a contract contained a disputes clause granting determinative power
to government officials, fraud presented the only ground to overturn the
decision and must be established by the contractor.37

30. Id. at 402; see also United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 237–40
(1946) (holding that the contractor must exhaust the administrative appeal procedure
before pursuing claims in court); United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 734–36 (1944)
(stating that even if the contracting officer’s conduct was such “as to imply bad faith” the
contractor must exhaust his administrative appeals before going to court).
31. See Merrill-Ruckgaber Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 387, 393 (1916) (holding
that the judgment of a supervising architect was determinative of an appeal when the
contract indicated that disputes would be decided by that architect); Plumley v. United
States, 226 U.S. 545, 547 (1913) (stating that the Secretary’s construction
determinations were conclusive due to the contract language).
32. 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
33. Id. at 461 (citations and quotations omitted).
34. Id. at 460.
35. 342 U.S. 98, 100–01 (1951); see Government Contracts Disputes, supra note 26, at
1430–31.
36. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. at 99, 101.
37. Id. at 100. Some judges recognized the problems with this holding. See id. at
102 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“We should allow the Court of Claims, the agency close
to these disputes, to reverse an official whose conduct is plainly out of bounds whether
he is fraudulent, perverse, captious, incompetent, or just palpably wrong.”); see also id.
at 103 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Men are more often bribed by their loyalties and
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The Wunderlich decision was met with widespread criticism,
including by government agencies who might benefit from the
holding,38 and quickly became an issue before Congress.39 In 1954,
Congress passed the Wunderlich Act in response to the case.40 The Act
provided that, “any such [agency] decision shall be final and
conclusive unless the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary
or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not
supported by substantial evidence.”41 The biggest difference here
between the Act and pre-Wunderlich precedent being the right to
appeal decisions not supported by substantial evidence.
C. Modernization of the Appeals System
In 1969, Congress created a commission to review the federal
contracting system and to recommend changes to Congress.42 The
resulting CDA created the structure that we see today in contractor
disputes.43 The CDA incorporated the function of contracting officers
in their quasi-judicial capacity, while also subjecting their
determinations to review by a structured system of courts and boards.44
The CDA also reduced the impact of the administrative record by
allowing both the boards and the CFC to supplement the record and
make de novo determinations of both law and fact.45 Further, Article
III appellate judges within the Court of Claims were granted authority
ambitions than by money. I still believe one should be allowed to have a judicial
hearing before his business can be destroyed by administrative action . . . .”).
38. See Schultz, supra note 24, at 233 (noting that criticism was widespread and
both the Department of Defense and General Services Administration agreed “to
return the disputes clause to its pre-Wunderlich meaning by administrative
amendment”; see also Swan, supra note 10, at 111 (explaining that “[t]he [Wunderlich]
decision alarmed many in the procurement community”).
39. Schultz, supra note 24, at 233 (noting that four remedial bills were introduced
in the House of Representatives and two were introduced in the Senate in response to
the Wunderlich decision).
40. Act of May 11, 1954, ch. 199, §§ 1–2, 68 Stat. 81 (formerly codified at 41 U.S.C.
§§ 321–22 (1958)).
41. Id.
42. See Pub. L. No. 91-129, 83 Stat. 269 (1969); Clarence Kipps et al., The Contract
Disputes Act: Solid Foundation, Magnificent System, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 585, 588 (1999).
43. See Wittich, supra note 26, at 130–31 (noting that the development of the contract
remedies system was unplanned and reactionary but culminated with the CDA).
44. See Jeri Kaylene Somers, Foreword, The Boards of Contract Appeals: A Historical
Perspective, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 745, 752–54 (2011).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 713 (1963) (noting
that the Court of Claims may make de novo determinations of disputed fact).
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to hear appeals from either forum, with de novo review of law but a
more limited review of factual determinations.46
As noted in the introduction, this expanded appeal right requires
contractors to submit a claim to the contracting officer as a preliminary
requirement for an appeal.47 One consequence arising from this right
is that, where contractors historically had appeal limitations due to
disputes clauses, contractors now may find claim requirements to be a
primary remaining jurisdictional barrier for contract appeals.
Although a claim under the CDA does not require a certain format, it
must include particular information so that a contracting officer is in
a position to make a final decision on the claim.48 In this way, a claim—
a written demand by one of the parties “as a matter of right” for the
payment of money, alteration of the contract, or some other type of
relief49—has similarities to the pleading requirements of a civil case.50
The standards for claims as preliminary dispute requirements can be
seen in Federal Circuit cases since the implementation of the CDA. For
example, in Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton,51 the Federal Circuit considered
whether a contractor’s communications to the contracting officer
could constitute a claim when there was no dispute between the parties

46. Wittich, supra note 26, at 144. The trial division of the Court of Claims was later
separated to create the Claims Court, and the appellate division was split off to create
the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37–38. The Claims Court would be
renamed as the Court of Federal Claims with the Federal Courts Administration Act
of 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516; see also Pensive Poser, What’s
in A Name? Or Does A Court by Any Other Name Smell As Sweet?, 48 PROCUREMENT LAW. 16
(2013) (tracing the history of the Court of Federal Claims name changes).
47. See 41 U.S.C. § 7103 (2012); FAR 2.101 (2018); Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60
F.3d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Under the CDA, a final decision by a
[contracting officer] on a ‘claim’ is a prerequisite for Board jurisdiction.”).
48. See FAR 52.233-1 (declaring a claim must be in writing with a certification); M.
Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(noting that a valid claim “need not be submitted in any form or use any particular
wording” but it must give the contracting officer notice of the basis and amount of the
claim and also indicate a request for a final decision).
49. FAR 2.101 (defining “Claim”); see also Reflectone, 60 F.3d at 1575 (noting that
the CDA does not define a claim, so it is necessary to look to the FAR implementation
of the CDA for the definition).
50. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring a claim for relief contain “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” a short and plain statement of
the claim, and a demand relief is sought).
51. 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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at the time the written claim documents were submitted.52 The court,
en banc, determined that where the requirements of a claim were met
in a nonroutine request for payment a dispute did not need to yet exist
for a contractor to meet the jurisdictional requirements.53
The Federal Circuit also addressed claim requirements in its 2010
Maropakis decision.54 Maropakis considered a claim for a construction
contract that was running behind schedule, implicating liquidated
damages and time extension issues.55 The contractor appealed to the
CFC, who found that it had no jurisdiction due to failure to meet claim
requirements.56 The contractor’s claim was based on a letter that it had
submitted to the contracting officer requesting a time extension and
indicating that it would dispute liquidated damages in the future.57 The
court found that the contractor’s letter was deficient as it lacked adequate
notice of the amount and basis for the claim, but it also held that the
intent of the contractor in their communications was insufficient.58
II. RECENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS
The development of contract appeals and contractor claim
requirements bring us to among the most notable government
contracting cases of this year by the Federal Circuit, Hejran Hejrat Co. v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers59 and DAI Global, LLC v.
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development.60
Hejran Hejrat examined the distinction between contractor
communications to a contracting officer that constitute a claim, versus
those that do not.61 Citing to prior Federal Circuit decisions in
Reflectone and Maropakis,62 the court reiterated that magic words were
not required as an element of a CDA claim: “‘a CDA claim need not be
submitted in any particular form or use any particular wording’ so long
as it has ‘a clear and unequivocal statement that gives the contracting
52. Id. at 1577–78.
53. Id.
54. M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
55. Id. at 1325–26.
56. Id. at 1326.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1328 (finding that “[a] claim cannot be based merely on intent to assert a claim
without any communication by the contractor of a desire for a contracting officer decision”).
59. 930 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
60. 945 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
61. Hejran Hejrat, 930 F.3d at 1357.
62. Id.
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officer adequate notice of the basis and amount of the claim.’”63
Accordingly, the court found that the contractor’s communications
constituted a claim even where the contractor had not requested a
final decision and where the contractor had previously communicated
that it was not pursuing a claim.64 In reaching this holding, the court
magnified the final decision difficulties of a contracting officer. A
contracting officer should no longer rely on the contractor’s
characterization of its communications when determining if they
should issue a final decision.
In DAI Global, the Federal Circuit considered the line between when
a claim certification did not meet the minimum certification
requirements versus when the certification was merely defective,
thereby allowing the contractor to correct the claim and preserve
contract appeal jurisdiction.65 In the case, the contractor was
apprehensive about assuming responsibility for claims sought by its
subcontractor but was required to certify the subcontractor’s claim for
the subcontractor to pursue reimbursement.66 In order to meet claim
requirements, the contractor phrased its certification in a way that
limited its stated accountability for improper subcontractor claims.67
The contracting officer, however, was late to notify the contractor that
it had issued a defective certification.68 Therefore, the Federal Circuit
determined that the claim was deemed denied and that the
contractor’s certification phrasing was sufficient to constitute a
defective and correctable certification under the statute.69 The Federal
Circuit’s decision underscores the importance of contracting officer
timeliness and indicates that contractors may have more leeway when
phrasing their certifications going forward.

63. Id. (quoting M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327
(2010) (citation and quotations omitted)).
64. Id.
65. See DAI Global, 945 F.3d at 1198; see also 41 U.S.C. § 7103(b) (2012) (requiring
contractors to submit a claim to contracting officer with certification as a preliminary
requirement for an appeal); FAR 33.201 (2018) (defining defective certification).
66. See Dev. Alternatives, Inc. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., CBCA 5942, 18-1 BCA ¶
37,147, rev’d, DAI Global, 945 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
67. DAI Global, 945 F.3d at 1197.
68. Id. at 1197–98.
69. Id. at 1200; see 41 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(3) (requiring, to excuse obligation to
render a final decision, the contracting officer to notify within sixty days of reasons
why a certification was defective).
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OUTLOOK
Hejran Hejrat and DAI Global also highlight two historical
developments in federal procurement: the long-term expansion of
contractor appeal rights and the role of the contracting officer as a
preliminary judge of contractor claims. By allowing imprecise
communications to be the basis of a CDA claim—and therefore an
appealable issue—the Federal Circuit follows the historical trend of
allowing more appeals to be heard and resolved on the merits rather
than barring or restricting appeal rights to agency determinations or
procedural requirements.70 However, the decisions also allowed the
contractor to bypass the preliminary review and decision making of a
contracting officer, in contrast with the traditional role of the
contracting officer as the preliminary decision-maker in contract
claims. Additionally, Hejran Hejrat and DAI Global make a contracting
officer’s administrative role more difficult, as a contracting officer can
no longer necessarily rely on their understanding of a contractor’s
communications when deciding whether to issue a final decision. The
holdings in both cases perhaps suggest that a contracting officer
should issue a final decision on any questionable reimbursement
communications as a safeguard.71
Contract appeals, whether from the contracting officer’s final
decision or from a judicial decision to the Federal Circuit, are a distinct
aspect of government contracting law that underlies much of the federal
procurement system. The structure has seen significant change over the
years but remains an important part of the contracting process as seen
through the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions. These developments
make this year’s Federal Circuit review—as well as future reviews from
this publication—of great interest to the procurement community.

70. See e.g., United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 239 (1946) (noting
that no court can justify disregarding the letter or spirit of appeal provisions arising
under a contract); Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 773 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (finding the CDA statute of limitations to be nonjurisdictional); Reflectone,
Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding a contractor’s
communications to the contracting officer could constitute a claim when there was no
dispute between the parties at the time the written claim documents were submitted).
71. See Ralph C. Nash, Postscript V: Requests for Equitable Adjustments vs. Claims, 33
NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 58 (2019) (opining that contracting officers should now issue a
final decision while also asking contractors if they mean to file a claim).

